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Abstract – As has been extensively exemplified in the ELF literature, users of English as 
a lingua franca are capable of using language to communicate in contextually appropriate 
ways even though in so doing they may not conform to the norms of Standard English or 
the usage of native speakers, which are generally taken to provide the benchmarks of 
competence in the language. This raises the question of what kind of construct competence 
is and how far it accounts for the ability to communicate. And if ‘incompetent’ users 
manage to be capable communicators, then what is the nature of this capability? If it refers 
to some kind of knowledge other than competence, what kind is it, and how is this 
knowledge acted upon in the actual pragmatic process of communication? Addressing 
these questions leads to the recognition that communication in general is achieved by the 
exercise of a general lingual capability that, unlike the concept of competence, is not a 
matter of conformity to the actual encodings of any particular language but the 
exploitation of the coding potential of virtual language. 
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As is now widely recognised, the extended networks of interaction that 
globalization has brought about have naturally resulted in the communicative 
use of language that transcends the borders of different languages 
conventionally associated with separate lingua-cultural communities. The use 
of English as a lingua franca (ELF) is a particularly striking example of such 
use. One obstacle in an understanding of this global lingual phenomenon, and 
therefore of the nature of ELF, is the proliferation of terms that have been 
used to label it. Jacquemet has provided a list of them: 
 
Just in the first decade of the twenty-first century, language scholars, never too 
shy to create new words, have introduced the following terms: codemeshing 
(Canagarajah 2006), transidiomatic practices (Jacquemet 2005), truncated 
multilingualism (Blommaert et al. 2005), transnational heteroglossia (Bailey 
2007), polylingualism (Jørgensen 2008), translanguaging (García 2009), 
plurilingualism (Canagarajah 2009), flexible bilingualism (Creese and 
Blackledge 2010), heterolingualism (Pratt et al. 2011), metrolingualism (Otsuji 
and Pennycook 2011), translingual practices (Canagarajah 2011), and 
transglossic language practices (Sultana et al. 2015). (Jacquemet 2016, p. 336) 
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All of these terms refer in one way or another to lingual practices, to kinds of 
linguistic behaviour or performance. The abstract knowledge that is assumed 
to be acted upon in these actual practices is, of course, what has been labelled 
‘competence’. But here too there is a confusing proliferation of terms. Just as 
practices have been labelled transidiomatic and translingual and transglossic, 
so competence has been variously labelled as sociolinguistic, strategic, multi-
lingual, inter-cultural and so on. All these, and many others, are the 
terminological outgrowths of Chomsky’s original formulation of the concept, 
beginning with Hymes’ definition of communicative competence as the 
ability to assess how far an expression in a language is grammatically 
possible, feasible in the sense of being readily decipherable, appropriate to 
context, and attested as having been actually performed (Hymes 1972). 
 Subsequently, communicative competence was said to consist of four 
components: grammatical, sociolinguistic, discourse and strategic (Canale 
1983), though how they relate to each other, or to the four features proposed 
by Hymes, is not made clear. In Bachman (1990) we find what is called 
‘language competence’ divided into no less than fourteen different 
components (for further discussion see Widdowson 2003, Ch. 12). It seems 
obvious that some clarification of the concept of competence is called for, 
and how it might relate to these different communicative practices that have 
been so variously and inventively named. 
 It might be, and indeed has been, argued that an enquiry into how 
language is used can dispense with the concept of competence altogether and 
should concentrate attention exclusively on the practices. This, for example, 
would appear to be the position taken by Pennycook, who urges the need: 
 
...to look at language as a practice is to view language as an activity rather 
than a structure, as something we do rather than a system we draw on. 
(Pennycook 2010, p. 2, emphasis added)  
 
Although, as the very use of ELF makes clear, language cannot simply be 
viewed as a separate self-enclosed formal system, using it must obviously 
involve drawing on some preconceived knowledge or other. It is not a matter 
of setting language as something we do in opposition to something we know, 
but of enquiring into the relationship between knowing and doing. The 
essential issue is how far this knowing can be equated with competence as 
this has been conventionally conceived.  
 The first point to make is that, although, as we have seen, it has been 
conceptualised in many different ways, competence has always been related 
to particular languages and communities assumed to be well-defined. This is 
of course made quite explicit in Chomsky’s formulation of the concept as 
being the linguistic knowledge of ‘an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely 
homogeneous speech community’ (Chomsky 1965, p. 3). But it is equally 
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clear if not so explicitly stated in Hymes’s account of communicative 
competence. Here competence is defined as the knowledge needed to 
recognise the degree to which a particular instance of a language measures up 
to a norm which is assumed to be conventional in a particular community. As 
Hymes puts it: 
 
There is an important sense in which a normal member of a community has 
knowledge with respect to all these aspects of the communicative systems 
available to him. (Hymes 1972, p. 282, emphasis added) 
 
It is hard to see how a normal member of a community is conceptually 
essentially different from Chomsky’s ideal speaker-listener and the 
community conceived of as enclosed and well defined, if not homogeneous. 
So, communicative competence is represented as a matter of conformity to a 
particular set of communal norms. The obvious implication is that you cannot 
competently communicate in a language unless you conform to the 
conventions that obtain in the community of its native speakers.  
 Communicative competence for Hymes then is inextricably bound up 
with the concept of a particular community of speakers. His concern is not 
how language is used in communication but how a particular language is 
conventionally used by members of a particular speech community. In this 
respect, he follows the traditional ethnographic approach to the study of 
communication. Here too it is the normative features of communal language 
use that is the focus of attention. This is how Saville-Troike puts it: 
 
The subject matter of the ethnography of communication is best illustrated by 
one of its most general questions: what does a speaker need to know to 
communicate appropriately within a particular speech community, and 
how does he or she learn to do so? Such knowledge, together with whatever 
skills are needed to make use of it, is communicative competence. The 
requisite knowledge includes not only rules for communication (both linguistic 
and sociolinguistic) and shared rules for interaction, but also the cultural rules 
and knowledge that are the basis for the context and content of communicative 
events and interaction processes. (…) The focus of the ethnography of 
communication is the speech community, the way communication within it 
is patterned and organized as systems of communicative events, and the 
ways in which these interact with all other systems of culture. (Saville-
Troike 2003, p. 3, emphasis added)1 
 
1  It is worth noting that the linking of competence to community necessarily involves the expression of 
socio-cultural identity. Ways of using a language define a particular community, which is why language 
and culture are said to be indivisible. But the use of the language as a communicative resource in contexts 
and for purposes outside these communities necessarily divides the language from its particular cultural 
associations and so provides for the variable expression of different cultural identities.  
 
BARBARA SEIDLHOFER, HENRY WIDDOWSON 26 
 
 
 
The focus then of ethnography is how language is used within speech 
communities but this, of course, presupposes that such communities can be 
clearly defined. According to Gumperz a speech community is:  
 
...any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by 
means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by 
significant differences in language usage. (Gumperz 1971, p. 114, emphasis 
added) 
 
Although this definition has the superficial appearance of precision, like the 
Hymes definition of competence, it is based on unsubstantiated normative 
assumptions: at what point, one might ask, are occurrences of interaction 
deemed to be ‘regular and frequent’, and what are the criteria for determining 
whether differences are ‘significant’ or not?  
 The concept of competence, then, dependent as it is on indeterminate 
ideas about what constitutes speech communities and their languages, is 
essentially what we have previously called a “convenient methodological 
fiction” (Seidlhofer 2011, p. 71). This is not to deny its validity, for all 
theoretical enquiry must be based on some idealised abstraction of one kind 
or other. But validity is also relative, and the abstraction has to be seen as 
having some plausible correspondence with an actual state of affairs. So long 
as communities are relatively lingua-culturally enclosed, it is indeed 
justifiable to define a speech community as:  
 
a local unit, characterized for its members by common locality and primary 
interaction. (Hymes 1974, p. 51)  
 
But this state of affairs no longer obtains in a world of shifting populations 
and digitalized networks of communicative interaction. This is, of course, 
particularly the case with English: users of the language are not members of a 
local unit sharing a common locality and obviously do not constitute a 
community characterized by a distinctive usage of shared verbal signs that 
can be identified as a language variety. What we have here are users who 
communicate ‘without competence’, not by conforming to the norms of a 
language variety but by the adaptive pragmatic exploitation of linguistic 
resources (Widdowson 2015). The traditional notion of speech community 
and the concept of competence that depends upon it clearly cannot account 
for the kind of translingual/transglossic/translanguaging practices that are 
enacted in global communication, and which are so clearly exemplified in 
ELF. But then the question arises: is there an alternative way of accounting 
for them?  
 As is clear from the preceding discussion, ELF is not to be conceived 
of as a kind of English, not a language variety, but essentially as the 
27 
 
 
 
Competence, capability and virtual language 
expedient exploitation of linguistic resources as a means of communication. 
That being so, it is misleading to focus attention on the E of ELF, as 
researchers have sometimes tended to do: the various forms that it can take 
are only symptoms of the communicative process, an epiphenomenon, and to 
focus on them can easily distract attention from the causative process itself. 
Understanding ELF therefore crucially depends on an understanding of the 
nature of communication in general.  
 Over fifty years ago, Roman Jakobson identified what he called ‘the 
constitutive factors in any speech event, in any act of verbal 
communication.’2 He set them out as follows: 
 
    CONTEXT 
ADDRESSER  MESSAGE  ADDRESSEE 
    CONTACT 
    CODE     (Jakobson 1960) 
 
Let us first consider the message factor. When we use this term in everyday 
communication we can mean one of two very different things. A message on 
the one hand is an actual piece of language, something that is worded in 
speech or writing, like the text messages we send when we email and twitter. 
In this sense, the message is a fixed linguistic entity, an encoding, which can 
therefore be described in sole reference to the code factor. But we also use 
the term message to refer to some intended meaning, to what is meant by a 
text, and in this case the message factor crucially relates to the factors of 
addresser and addressee. Whereas the message in one sense is a text that can 
be decoded, in the other sense it is a discourse that can only be interpreted.  
 It is the relationship between these two senses of message that is 
central to an understanding the nature of communication. Two questions 
arise.  
1.  How are we to define the code that is used in the encoding of a particular 
message form? 
2.  How is this encoding related to the intended and interpreted message 
meanings of addresser and addressee? 
Scholars who have been concerned with the ethnography of communication 
generally assume that the code is what de Saussure calls langue, a system of 
rules that define the formal properties of a standard language, a knowledge of 
which constitutes the linguistic competence of its speakers. These are the 
rules that are enshrined in standard grammars and dictionaries of particular 
 
2  This was later taken up and extended by Hymes (1974) to provide a framework for the ethnographic 
description of communicative practices in particular communities, in line with the approach to the 
ethnography of communication discussed earlier.  
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languages, and knowing them, according to Hymes, enables a ‘normal 
member of speech community’ to assess how far a particular message form is 
possible in a language, that is to say how far it conforms to rule. To talk of 
normal members presupposes an abstract norm. As pointed out earlier, this 
would seem to correspond with Chomsky’s ideal speaker-listener for it is 
obvious that actual speaker listeners vary considerably in their competence 
and have only a partial knowledge of the code recorded in the grammars and 
dictionaries which represent their language. What then counts as the code of a 
language in this view is an abstract construct of what an ideal community of 
‘normal’ speakers knows of a set of encodings, canonical message forms that 
represent what de Saussure calls un état de langue – a language state, a static 
language. As such the concept is both too broad and too narrow: too broad 
because it assumes that all speakers have the same common competence 
which they clearly do not, too narrow because it defines a code as a sum of its 
present manifestations without allowing for its inherent potential for further 
exploitation.  
 For a code cannot be equated with the collectivity of types of message 
form that have resulted from its use. These forms conform to certain 
encoding principles but the forms that have actually been produced by no 
means exhaust the virtual potential of the code. It just happens that certain 
forms have historically been suited to particular communicative purposes in 
the contexts of use of particular communities and have thus become 
conventionally established. So, what linguists describe as the English 
language are the particular encodings that serve the communicative needs of 
particular communities, and have become conventionalised over time and as 
these needs change, so some encodings fall out of use, new ones emerge and 
descriptions are revised accordingly to keep up to date. And so, we get 
grammars or dictionaries of current English or German or Italian. But what 
is current is also what is only temporary and fleeting and soon dated. 
Grammars or dictionaries are essentially historical documents of actually 
attested manifestations of code use, not accounts of the code itself. They 
describe the forms the realization of this potential has taken, but not what 
forms it might take. In this sense grammars and dictionaries of current 
English are no different from those of Old or Middle English: descriptions of 
idealized états de langue.  
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The very fact that grammars and dictionaries have to be continually 
updated makes it obvious that any description of the present state of the 
language can only be a very partial account - an account of conventionalized 
encodings - and does not represent the inherent potential of the code itself – of 
ways in which this potential can be used to make meanings to meet the needs 
of changing circumstances.  
 We refer to this inherent meaning making potential as the virtual 
language. The term ‘meaning potential’ will perhaps be familiar: it is used by 
Halliday, and used also in reference to formally encoded linguistic properties 
(Halliday 1973). But there is a crucial difference. For Halliday, this meaning 
potential is inherent in the grammatical systems of actualised encodings. These 
systems take the form they do because they have evolved to serve social and 
communicative purposes, that is to say, pragmatic functions in the past have 
been systematized as the semantics of the present state of the language, and 
hence the name Systemic/Functional Grammar. One may accept that the 
formal systems of the present grammar of English are historically determined 
by the pragmatic functions they have been needed for in the past, but it does 
not follow that they determine what pragmatic functions the language will be 
needed for in the future. On the contrary, since these needs will necessarily 
relate to quite different contexts and purposes, the form the language takes 
will, on Halliday’s own argument, change accordingly. (For further discussion 
see Widdowson 2004, Ch. 2). 
 Pragmatic function is obviously not simply the direct projection of a 
conventionalized semantic system but the exploitation of the code potential of 
which this system is one realization. It is of course true that such a system has 
meaning potential in the sense that, like any grammar, it allows for creativity in 
the Chomskyan sense – the production of infinite formal permutations. But this 
is strictly confined creativity bound by conformity to the conventionalized 
systemic rules that define the actual language. The meaning potential that 
serves the variable and ever-changing communicative needs of language users 
cannot be, and clearly is not, so confined. They can only be met by the creative 
exploitation of the encoding resources represented by the virtual language. 
 But the particular message forms that are created to meet these needs 
will conform to the encoding principles of the virtual language. Such principles 
must pre-exist in the minds of communicators: code is an essential factor and 
communication would be impossible without it. So, what is the nature of this 
code conceived of as constituting the virtual language, and how do users 
conform to its principles in the adaptively creative process of making 
meaning?  
 The first point to be made is that a code, as usually understood, is of its 
nature internally consistent so that all message forms encoded in it conform to 
its rules and can be reliably deciphered accordingly. The term is therefore a 
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misnomer in reference to Standard English, which, of course, bristles with 
inconsistencies, with idiosyncratic encodings that have accumulated over time 
by historical happenstance. The way adverbial particles are attached to some 
transitive verbs but not to others is an obvious example: attend to but not 
notice to, talk about but not discuss or describe about and so on. The plural 
morpheme is attached to abstract nouns like communication, opinion, expense 
but not to, evidence, information, advice. Some nouns denoting human 
qualities are morphologically derived from adjectives, like sadness, happiness, 
boldness, foolishness, cleverness but this does not apply to semantically related 
nouns like gay, anxious, brave, stupid. Since a code, by definition, is to be 
consistent, it seems reasonable to say that there are virtual rules in English 
whereby all nouns can be pluralised by what might be called the proto-morph -
s, and can be derived from adjectives with the proto-morph -ness. So, 
expressions like evidences and advices are entirely consistent with the virtual 
language rules. Similarly, anxiousness and braveness are regular formations 
whereas the standard English encodings anxiety and bravery are not.  
 To take another example, some adjectives can be negated by the prefix 
un- as in unhappy, unsure, uncomfortable, unavoidable whereas others are 
assigned a different prefix – insecure, inconsiderate, incompetent, 
inappropriate, inevitable, irresponsible. One might of course attempt to 
discover regularities and so reduce these idiosyncrasies to rule. We might, for 
example, propose an encoding rule that constrains the use of in- to words of at 
least three syllables which would preclude the formation of un-considerate, 
un-comprehensible but then it would also preclude two syllable words in 
standard English like im-possible and in-active and the four syllable un-
precedented. Again, one might propose that the use of un- or in- is determined 
not only by syllabic but also morphological constraints – that it is words of two 
or more syllables that have the -able or -ible suffix that require the in- prefix. 
Words like in-conceivable and in-dispensible would conform to this encoding 
rule, but the standard un-imaginable and un-controllable would not. 
 The quest for lower order encoding rules of increasing complexity 
would quickly fall prey of the law of diminishing returns and lose explanatory 
value. It would seem more sensible to propose that in-/im- are idiosyncratic 
allomorphic variants of what we might call the proto-morph un- which is 
regular encoding of adjective negation in the virtual language. It just happens 
that the in- variant is preferred to un- used for some adjectives in one variety of 
English. But this is an incidental feature of conventional usage and not a 
constraint imposed by the code. In this view, words like un-possible, un-
conceivable, are entirely in conformity with virtual encoding rules. (For further 
discussion see Widdowson 2015). 
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The point is that encoding rules of Standard English are not 
consistently applied, and of course the same is true of other languages, and it 
is this in or un consistency, this irregularity – or unregularity, or disregularity 
– that poses such difficulty for learners who, to achieve so-called competence 
in a language, have to know when rules apply and when they do not.  
 Their difficulty is compounded by the fact that this variability of rule 
application very often has little if any communicative significance. To take 
one example: the expression next to. In an earlier state of English, this, like 
the semantically similar preposition near, had no particle attached to it, hence 
the place name Wells Next the Sea. The absence of to presents no problem in 
understanding. Indeed, communicatively effective message forms can be 
produced while dispensing entirely with the particle to whatever its encoded 
function. This is amusingly illustrated in a poem by Sophie Hannah. 
 
Wells-Next-the-Sea 
I came this little seaside town 
And went a pub they call The Crown 
Where straight away I happened see 
A man who seemed quite partial me. 
I proved susceptible his charms 
And fell right in his open arms. 
From time time, every now and then, 
I hope meet up with him again. 
 
This encoded feature of Standard English is dispensed with to create a 
particular effect. That is its purpose. But for many purposes and for many if 
not most users of English, other features of Standard English can be – and are 
– dispensed with as surplus to communicative requirement. 
 What these users do is to exploit the redundancies of conventionalized 
encodings, often by regularizing their inconsistencies. So, the use of 
expressions that do not replicate conventional encodings, like anxiousness, or 
informations, or unsecure, are entirely in accord with encoding rules. Where 
they occur, in ELF usage for example, they are evidence of direct access to 
these rules, bypassing the conventions of the standard language, which have 
no necessary relevance for effective communication. Such forms are of 
course incorrect in reference to Standard English, but such correctness has to 
do with norms of linguistic conduct that apply only restrictively in certain 
communities and have little if any relevance anywhere else. Correct English 
is usually equated with proper English, but proper English has to do with 
propriety, that is to say conformity to conventionalized linguistic etiquette, 
and this has only a very limited bearing on communicative appropriacy – or 
appropriateness. On the contrary, for countless users of English, so called 
native speakers included, conformity to the correctness and the propriety of 
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Standard English would inhibit the adaptable use of linguistic resources to 
produce communicatively effective message forms. 
 Hymes’ familiar definition of communicative competence is, as was 
pointed out earlier, based on the concept of an enclosed community, a 
‘normal’ member of which can make certain judgements about a particular 
message form. One judgement is the extent to which it is possible, and since 
the judgement is norm based, this can only mean the extent to which the 
message form is correct or proper in reference to conventionalized encodings. 
The possible does not account for the creative potential of the virtual code. 
Another judgement is the extent to which a particular message form is 
actually performed. Nowadays, corpus analysis provides a mass of objective 
data on which such a judgement can be reliably based. In consequence, what 
counts as correct or proper English has over recent years been extended to 
include not only what conforms to established encodings but also what 
conforms to idiomatic patterns of actual native speaker usage. This is said to 
be real or authentic English and the assumption seems to be that users are 
communicatively competent to the extent that they conform to these patterns 
of usage. But of course these are conventionalized message forms, patterns of 
performance which are only real for a select and relatively small number of 
native speaker users. They are instances of what is actually attested as having 
been produced – but only by a restricted community of users. 
 So, to return to Jakobson’s factors, it is obvious that what form a 
message takes to be communicatively effective cannot be determined by how 
a particular community of addressers and addressees make use of code 
resources as appropriate to their own contexts of use. The nature of 
communication cannot be accounted for by describing how a particular 
community of users communicate. But it is not only that different 
communicative contexts and purposes will necessarily call for the creative 
exploitation of the virtual code but in the case of English as a lingua franca 
users will naturally draw on the encoding resources of languages other than 
English to produce hybrid message forms. So, for example, lexical items 
from one linguistic source may be phonologically or morphologically adapted 
to conform to another’s encoding principles. Or where an expression is 
entirely well formed according to the virtual morphological rules of English 
but whose syntactic structure conforms to the principles of another language. 
Such linguistic hybridity is well attested in ELF, as it is of course in learner 
language. And in both cases, it is taken as a sign of incompetence. 
 And it is indeed a sign of incompetence - if competence is defined as 
knowing how to produce message forms which are in conformity with the 
conventionalised encodings of the standard language and the patterns of 
attested native speaker usage. But incompetent users can be capable 
communicators and indeed their capability in many ways depends on their 
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incompetence. It has been suggested that the linguistic hybridity of ELF use 
is evidence of multilingualism. But multilingualism, or plurilingualism, 
would seem to suggest the co-existence of competences in one or more 
distinct languages, that the production of hybrid message forms is a kind of 
code-switching. But in the dynamic interplay of the different factors in the 
communicative process, these forms are compounded expediently from 
whatever linguistic resources are immediately available to the participants, 
whatever their competences in the source languages might be. It is not that 
they are monolingual, or bilingual or multilingual or plurilingual, or 
translingual, or interlingual – they are just lingual, and being lingual involves 
the adaptable creative use of the potential of virtual language. In other words, 
it involves the exercise of a general lingual capability. 
 To conclude, we have argued that the concept of communicative 
competence as it has been defined by Hymes and other ethnographers, and 
has been adopted as authoritative in the pedagogy of English teaching and 
testing, is in effect a misconception of how language is actually used in 
communication. It only accounts for the knowledge that native speaker-
listeners have of the encodings that have over time become conventionalised 
as normal within their own homogeneous speech communities. It is a concept 
that represents a way of thinking about English that is rooted in the past and, 
as the study of ELF makes clear, is no longer valid. To quote T. S. Eliot: 
 
For last year's words belong to last year's language  
And next year's words await another voice.   
 Little Gidding 
 
ELF users do not communicate by using last year’s language – a language 
that belongs to somebody else. They have to find their own voice in their own 
words and we cannot know just what form these will take. The description of 
next year’s words of ELF voices, we might say, await another VOICE.3  
 
Bionotes: Barbara Seidlhofer is Professor of English and Applied Linguistics at the 
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variation, esp. the description of English as an international language, and its implications 
for teacher education. She is the founding director of the Vienna-Oxford International 
Corpus of English (VOICE), founding editor of the Journal of English as a Lingua 
Franca, and past editor of the International Journal of Applied Linguistics. Her books 
include Understanding English as a Lingua Franca (OUP), Controversies in Applied 
Linguistics (OUP), Foreign Language Communication and Learning (Mouton De Gruyter, 
 
3  Cf. VOICE. 2013. The Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (version 2.0 online). Director: 
Barbara Seidlhofer; Researchers: Angelika Breiteneder, Theresa Klimpfinger, Stefan Majewski, Ruth 
Osimk-Teasdale, Marie-Luise Pitzl, Michael Radeka. http://www.univie.ac.at/voice/  
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